The article deals with the notion of the "Creature" as being displayed in Joseph Wittig's essay titled Der Weg zur Kreatur. This piece by Wittig (1879Wittig ( -1949, one of the co-founders of the journal Die Kreatur, himself a banished Catholic thinker, an excommunicated theologian, was published in the third volume of the journal in 1929/1930. The major argument to be presented here, following Wittig's essay, concerns the path (but also the method) into the world of the creature, namely, the way-back, a regression, which depends on countermovements, suspensions, gestures of recollection and witnessing. This path is based on the potentialities of the "first question"a demand for the first word, a proper name for the silent, forgotten creature, being invited to encounter. The encounter with the creatures is a method of thinking, a way of being in this world that is based on the possibility of asking rightly the "first question". For what this question performs is an attention, hearing of, a method of listening. In asking the question of (and for) the creature, language itself turns toward the world of the creation, in a search for a proper name, calling creation to be heard, to belong.
I
The "first question" is that of the creature. It is the question concerning the being of creation. The initial question (but perhaps the final one too)the "prologue," the opening word, is also an "epilogue"a testimony regarding the world of creation. This first question about the being of creation, however, studies the affinities between man and the animal, revealing the dialectics of human existence and the future of life on Earth. In asking the question of the creature, new attention is directed towards what being is. In asking this question, however, the human engages him or herself with Itwith the nameless, silent creature. The question itself is an expression of attention, curiosity, awareness and responsibility for the being of the creature. This question about the being of creation is thus an act of opening. 1 The question itself opens new frames of being-together.
This question calls for renewed attention regarding the being of creatures in both poetical and ethical aspects. Furthermore: the question of the creature has a political dimension too, as it calls us to reconsider the concepts of sovereignty, the matter of law and the implications of violence. 2 The question of the creature is a foundational element of every search for the mapping of forms of life. However, before assuming ecological implications or dealing with the contemporary, critical aspects of creaturely beingwhich are also related to new technological conditions and forms of global consumptionwe propose to study this question in a rather a minor theoretical context, and to suggest a method for close reading. This brings us to the fascinating scenes of German and Jewish cultural enterprises during the 1920s and 1930s. This essay is dedicated to a minor "case-study," an article by the Catholic thinker and theologian Joseph Wittig. His contribution was published in the journal Die Kreatur, to which German-Jewish authors such as Martin Buber were affiliated. The question of the creature was thus formulated in a crucial historical context of Germany circa 1930 and was affiliated with joint efforts of Germans and Jews engaging together on the question of being.
II
This "first question", the question of the creature, was presented in a minor essay by Joseph Wittig titled "Der Weg zur Kreatur." Wittig (1879-1949)himself a banished Catholic thinker, an excommunicated theologianpublished the essay in the third volume of Die Kreatur (1929/30), of which he was a co-founder. The major argument to be presented here, following Wittig's essay, concerns der Weg, the way or path (but also the method) into the world of the creature. This paththe Wegreveals itself as a way back, a regression or movement that depends on gestures of counter-thinking, suspension, recollection and witnessing. This path, the method itself dictating the possibilities of thinking (and of writing), is based on the potentialities of the "first question." This "first question" we are about the study is the quest for a word, a proper name to assign to the silent, forgotten creature. The first question is thus an act of re-collocation, a remembrance. It is an invitation, a call for an encounter with the essence of creation itself. This act is first and foremost a method of thinking, which nevertheless reflects a way of being in this world based on the possibility of properly asking the "first question." For such a question, as we have argued, amounts to a performance of attention, a method of listening. In asking the question of (and for) the creature, language itself turns toward the world of the creation in a search for a proper name. It calls creation into a form of belonging.
The act of asking the first question is a recall of creation, summoning the creature into an encounter. However, how is this question spoken, performed, and written in Wittig's essay? The question appears in his essay following a short tale, an anecdote about a shepherd, Hirtenjunge, an unfortunate young fellow who returns one day from the field in tears, mourning. His master, the farmer, assuming the young shepherd had lost one of his flock to a wolf, is eager to punish the young man. As the boy disputes his master's accusation and the decision to cut his salary in compensation for the loss, the farmer scolds the poor boy for lacking manners in attempting to argue the last word in the conversation. Yet the young fellow responds once more:
Das erste Wort laßt ihr mir ja nicht. 3
This "first word" that is never given properly is the word we usually ignore, forgetting it in favor of arguing the "last word"the word of decision, the expression of conclusion. This first word, the missing word that the young shepherd does not possess, is the prologue, calling the creature into being. What the boy is not allowed to say, the first word, is a word of mourning: crying for the creature, a word also expressing his own responsibility, his own being-loss.
Wittig is well aware of this irony: since the first wordthe word for the sake of the creatureis never given properly, any discussion or argument is already doomed by presumptions of knowledge and power. What remains for a young man, already accused, blamed, and put on trial, is to ask desperately for the last word. His own sorrow and despair, his lament for the creature, finds no word in the conversion. Wittig refers to this tale at the beginning of his article not only in order to demonstrate injustice in the social structure, or to reveal inter-generational tensions. Instead, he calls our attention to a first word that is not being given, a word for the creatures. The master and the young shepherd are confined within the wrong discourse, they speak in a language which itself has already lost its orientation in being, a language in which man finds no affinities, no comfort, and the sorrow of creation is doomed not to be heard. It is the language of man being dominated by acts of accusation (in Germandas Urteil), in which the creatures are left silent. 4 But might there be a way back, a detour, a path towards the initial conditions of language? Is it possible to ask the "first question" again, to find a word that is proper? These questions stand at the heart of Wittig's enterprise.
Such a way back from the wrong path of language and being, Wittig argues, taking this first step towards the creature, depends on our ability to rightly ask the "first question," to find the first word, an expression of care and solidarity. Is this word, however, not the simplest of all? Wittig writes:
Ich wandere suchend nach dem Lande, das vor allen Diskussionen liegt, und fürchte mich nicht davor, daß ich in immer größere Einfältigkeit hineingerate. 5
What Wittig is searching for is a "land"a field, a realm of languageturned secret, one that lays before the discourse itself, a terrain that precedes the false discussions. What he seeks is a register that is hidden in all discourses of knowledge and power. This act suggested by Wittig, the return into the field, going back to the land, is perhaps a "simple" one and seems to be an act of regression, a withdrawal. In asking the "first question," one seems to turn back towards foundational, primitive theoretical registers. It even appears to be a falling back into a false version of romanticism, like a wrong attempt to experience the primordial affinities of man and nature. Should we follow this path?
One must assume that every attempted return implies a certain degree of falseness. Wittig, however, does not speak about re-turn in its regressive meaning as a way back to the gates of a paradise lost. There is, presumably, a simplicity, naiveté perhaps, in Wittig's arguments. But the matter of this quest (the "first question") can be read differently. The argument for re-turn in the field of being expresses an attempt at re-orientation, of finding a way back into being, into affinities and a sense of responsibility towards the world of creation. This turn depends, however, on our ability to listen properly; it demands the skill of hearing, an attention to the silent vocals and hidden sights of the created being. This attempt to regain the capacity for attention (and responsibility), is based upon the posing of the first questionthe quest for the creatures. This path, we should agree, is perhaps the simplest of all, yet the most difficult to reach.
Wittig asks his readers to follow his path in a search for proper namesnames to be given to the work of creation. He seeks this first word, namely the way of language to open itselftowards the creature, to call back the animals, the trees, the flowers and the stones, which were left namelessto thresholds of conversation.
The very word Kreatur still exists, Wittig argues, but is pronounced only in an improper, false discursive context. For this word no longer includes the human himself, who denies his own belonging, his own creaturely being:
Es ist ja sehr bezeichnend, daß die Menschen geneigt sind, den Namen "Kreatur" zu beschränken auf Steine, Pflanzen und Tiere. Sich selber dazu zu rechnen, müssen sie sich erst zwingen. 6
The denial of the creaturely being is a mode of human self-denial. What is repressed here, however, is not only the belonging of man to the world of creation, his being-with other creatures in a togetherness of man and nature, but rather man's responsibility for the work of creation. What is recovered is the human responsibility, man's role in giving a language to nature. What is forgotten is this first word, man's response to nature expressing his own being in affinity. Responsibility depends on willingness to respond, entering the realm of the encounter. As long as man denies his or her own creaturely being, denying our essential affinities to the world of creation, we are left ungrounded out of ourselves. This, Wittig writes in his essay, is the loss of orientationthe Verlaufen of man as we move away from the creature: ein weglaufen von der Kreatur. The way back to this site of encounter (once called Eden), Wittig writes, is the longest yet.
Indeed, a few of Wittig's examples, such as his anecdotes on sights unseen and voices unheard in nature, seem simplistic or at least familiar. A negotiation with a house-cat, view of flowers that flourish thanks to the love of a dedicated gardener, or that of a cat taking care of dog's cubs, seem at first to attest to a poor register of the dialogical mind often assumed to govern Martin Buber's tales in his monumental Ich und Du. 7 At first glance, there seems no irony or dialectic of thought in these "examples." However, we should read these tales in Wittig's article not only as examples or short stories offering a rather weak discursive power, and thus as philosophically inadequate. The theoretical aspect of these stories (again, once they are read as examples) seems insignificant.
Once again we ask: should we follow Wittig's path? The telling of these anecdotes in the middle of an essay on the lost language of manthe loss of the first word, the proper name given by man to call the creatures into conversationis itself an attempt to find the way (a way in language). 8 The stories that Wittig tells are not simply evidence for the possibility of regaining the skills to hear and to speak to or with nature. Neither should they be understood as an attempt to retell the secret of creaturely life. These tales are rather gestures, moments of interruption, creating ein Umweg, a detour or return leading us into higher modes of attention and levels of recognition. The return of the storyteller in the discussion on the "first question" is itself a significant gesture that Wittig explores as a skill. The simple, everyday anecdotes on loss and recoverywhich seem suitable for such minor circles of literature as a children's book perhapsalso mark the beginnings of a poetical thinking. These tales signify a poetical way (again: ein Umweg) of engaging with being. They are read as remnants, leftovers not only of a mythical experience of the world, but as witnesses to the "first word." Wittig recalls these tales especially through childhood:
Ich hatte solcher Geschichten schon viele in meiner Knabenzeit gelesen und gehört, und sie waren durchaus nicht alle durch lehrhafte Absicht verdorben. War es nun eine selige Erinnerung an jene Zeit, in der ich noch keinen großen Unterschied machte zwischen Menschen und Tier, oder war es vielmehr die Freude an einer neuen Aufgabe, die dem Manne wird? 9
Again: Wittig storytelling should not be considered as mere examples expressing the longing for the lost affinities of man and nature, but rather as a recollection of childhood. What Wittig describes are symptoms of a long memory attesting to the intimacy of storytelling. Not the child alone but a whole generation is being recalled in these tales. The anecdotes in Wittig's article gain a fairytale dimension. In such moments we once again experience the "first question," the quest for a first word, a proper one expressing what we are.
We argue, then, that Wittig's question "Wo ist der Weg?" concerns language itself. Yet languagebeyond its forms of expressionconstitutes forms of life. The "first word," a logos, is a call for the constitution of being. When we askfollowing Wittig, about the implications of proper names, we ask about human engagement in the world. It is the question regarding the initial step, which is the longest, the hardest and the oldest of all. Recovering the first word is not only an expression, but the recalling of a collective experience.
8 Compare with Benjamin's thesis on the proper name and its creative implication in human being: Benjamin, "Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen", 149-150. 9 Wittig, 138-39.
The turn back into the realm of the creatures, Wittig continues, following Martin Buber, leads to a way filled with obstacles and hindrances. Taking this path leads to disorientation in being experienced as disorders. The encounter with a house cat, with the gaze of the animal, looking at us in "truly a speaking gaze," raises questions, indeed the very initial questions: "Was ist das?!" (What is this?!), "Bin ich da?" (Am I there?), "Bin ich Dir da?" (Am I there for you?). 10 The first signs of the conversation with the creature are of disorientation, and they are marked by doubt and self-crisis. However, these are the initial signs of a language in a search of a proper name, a word expressing affinity, belonging, and responsibility: "am I there for you?"
Once we follow Wittig's path of retelling the "first question" (the quest for the word, for a name which is proper), we are called to encounter ourselves, to engage our own creaturely condition as reflected by our view of the animal's eye. This experience causes a rupture in the congenital order, a crisis in the being the self: it brings about moments of anxiety and disorientation: What is this? Where am I? The human is no longer by himself, for something strange, something unfamiliar enters his/her realmthe It. 11 We recall Martin Buber's heroic attempt to recover the dialogical realm through a reconstruction of the encounter with the silent being. Buber's question is still valid: might we respond to the gaze of an animal? Can we find a word to call the creature back from its Eswelt, the world of It, into the Duwelt, the world of I and Thou, the world of being-together? No simple answer is to be found in Wittig's essay, but some evidence for the possibilities of such an encounter do find expression. The gaze of the animal, Wittig writesfollowing Buberis a sign of being in language. 12 However, these moments of encounter are minor. They are doomed to disappear with the disappearance of the animal's gaze. The time-frame of the encounter with the creature is the Augen-Blick.
III
What we call the "first question" is the quest for the creature, a pathlost to the worldof creation. In asking this question properly, as to call the creature by name, man turns towards his or her own being. Wittig understands the loss of 10 Wittig, 139. 11 On the implication of the human wordcalling things from empty being into the dialogical realm compare with Rosenzweig's remark: Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988, 208. 12 Wittig, 140 .
The Creature, the First Question this path in liturgical terms, as the loss of human prayer, and with it of the proper word for praying for the world of creation. He quotes the following note:
Denn wir kommen von oben und wissen um das Obere, sind aber gesandt zu den Dingen der Erde, um sie zu erkennen und zu lieben, damit auch sie teilhaben an dem Leben Gottes. Wir haben noch sehr weit zu ihnen, denn einstweilen vermögen wir nur, sie zu benutzen. Wir wissen nur, daß sie sind, wissen aber nicht, wer sie sind. 13
Man forgets to properly ask the question regarding creatures: Who are they? The relations of man to the world of creation is typically limited to exploitation and its false question: What for? Wittig understands this corruptionthe reduction of the encounter of man and the world into productions and performances of violenceas a fall.
Let us recall: the question Wittig presents to his readers, namely the "first question," concerns the word, the proper name given to the being of the creature. What is being sought in Wittig's essay is the way back to the world of creation, once called Eden. But where is this way to be found? He asks: Wo ist der Weg? 14 Wittig then turns to reflect on the question regarding the way itself; he seeks direction. A new direction (redirecting the question of being), however, is neither a target nor a way that leads to a certain aim or to a certain place. It is rather a name that is assigned to an experience, a name given for a method of thinking, a poetical one. This way is both the longest and shortest one, simultaneously the most simple and most difficult of all, for it directs us back into ourselves, into a deep awareness of our own creaturely being. It demands a return, a move toward being that is concrete and singularand yet exceptional.
This method of being (again: a way of being, a path of life), both exceptional and concrete, in which we return to acknowledge the creaturely condition of our own being, Wittig argues, is experienced during Carnival:
Chaos und Narrheit brechen durch, es wird Karneval, und Karneval erhebt die Gesetzlosigkeit zum Gesetz. 15 During the day of the carnival, a day of (collective) freedom and the suspension of civil norms, of Chaos, Narrheit und Gesetzlosigkeit, we experience higher degrees of existential order, namely the order of creation. A certain nihilistic experience is thus required in the search for a way back to a real relationship with the creatures (our own creaturely being). Carnival emancipates us from law 13 Wittig, 141. 14 Wittig, 142. 15 Wittig, 144. itself, from the universal, abstract frame of thinking and being. It is, however, not an experience of disorder, but rather an awareness, a concrete attention to our own creaturely beingthe sensual, erotic dimension of lifecelebrated on the day of carnival. What the carnival implies, Wittig argues, is a form of life in which man regains a sensual attention. In this context, Wittig recounts how he once learned the secret of painting while observing a tree in a house yard. It was not a tree in its generic form, an object of painting; rather, this tree standing in the garden near the house, this concrete special being, was the subject of art.
The encounter with the creature, reengaging the creaturely being, demands a mode of singularity, an ability to name the concrete being. What Wittig is searching for is neither an artistic method of documenting being, nor an aesthetic form of experience. What he seeks is a state of mind, Erkenntnis: cognition of the world grounded in this quest for togetherness. Wittig, however, never conceals the liturgical motivation of his quest: a fulfilment of man's destiny in the name of God. Yet this does not lead Wittig to either a dogmatic (orthodox) or to an academic theological view. On the contrary, he rejects such "heavy books and works of many volumes by the church." 16 In his view, scholarly works and theoretical observations alike create obstacles and hindrances. The liturgical mission of man is rather "simple": man is called to learn the first word again, a word that is proper for a prayer.
IV
Wittig's world-view is dialogical. He follows Martin Buber's concept of conversation, as well as the idea of encounter with the creature. Wittig understands this mode of conversation as one of Verbindung, a connection, a way of beingtogether:
Niemals will ich mit dem Baume reden, wie ein Dichter mit den Dingen der Natur redet; ich will mit ihm nur so reden, wie ein Gottesgeschöpf mit einem anderen Gottesgeschöpf redet, will also den Baum nicht etwa erst zum Menschen machen, damit er mit mir rede. Ich will mich bloß mit ihm in Verbindung bringen auf der uns beiden gemeinsamen Ebene unseres Geschaffenseins. 17
The conversation with the tree is not the same as a human conversation. To speak to the subjects of creation, to speak with nature, requires its own modes of language. Nature, however, has turned silent. The creatures live by themselves verschlossen, or closed in solitude. Man's efforts ought to be directed at a means of finding the proper name (the "first word"), for entering this realm of creation. Wittig seems to attest to a simple method, a romantic or perhaps sentimental engagement. However, he understands well that such a shift in the order of things, a real move toward the creature, demands a turning point in Western civilization, a step back from the wrong path of modernity, in which the creatures are taken as sources for use, as instruments for work, as objects of knowledge. 18 Wittig protests against the Nutzbarmachung, the making of nature useable to the sciences and the industries. He knows, however, that the problem lies not only in the abuse of nature but also in language itself. In his quest for a dialogical turning point with regard to the creatures, Wittig recalls the liturgical enterprise of Martin Buber's and Franz Rosenzweig's translation of the Hebrew Bible into German. In his view, the enterprise of liturgical translation implies precisely the effort to regain the proper names for creation. Buber and Rosenzweig, in translating the verses of the Book of Genesis, were in a search for the "first word," recalling the order of creation. In this context Wittig refers to their translation of one verse from the book of Genesis:
The translation reads:
Erfüllet die Erde und werdet ihrer mächtig
In this translation, Wittig argues, no word is false, for it does not make a claim about the government of man over the land or about the making of the Earth into his property. To be mächtig implies neither the occupation of the created land nor a rule or possession over its subjects. This verse should rather be understood, once it is read in the context of this German-Jewish translation, as a call for responsibility, as a marker for the engagement of man in the created world. The liturgical translation of Buber and Rosenzweig puts forward, according to Wittig, the possibility of a non-violent (non-aggressive) interpretation of human power.
The fact that Wittig, himself an excommunicated priest and Christian theologian banished by the Catholic Church, addresses the radical element of the Bible translation, made by German-Jewish authors, demands further attention, which we cannot address here. Yet, Wittig's remark attests at the dialogical implications of his writing, telling perhaps about the dialogical implication of the Journal enterprise itself -Die Kreatur, in calling Jews and Christian into a conversation.
What the Bible translation of Buber and Rosenzweig offers is the right word, a name well given, signing the responsibility of man in the world of creation. Wittig understood the German-Jewish liturgical project as a source for a turn in being. The translation form the ancient biblical Hebrew into modern German is itself an episode in the search for a word naming the being-together of man and nature. What the translation is able to do, rather, is to openwithin the realm of language itselfa mode of belonging that is not yet determined by metaphysical assumptions about the priorities of human reason and subjectivity.
However, finding this worda proper name for recalling the belonging of man and creationdemands the giving up of the final word, the word of judgment that is a signature of the desire to power and the origin of authority. The last word, we recall, is that of a decision, the most violent of all. The last wordthe word of judgmentwishes to bring all forms of life to a conclusion, to finalize being. This last word is a closure. The first word, part of a quest (a longing for) is rather to be understood as an opening. The fact that Wittig identifies this effort in the liturgical enterprise of such German-Jewish thinkers as Buber and Rosenzweig, we argue, attests to the dialogical dimension of his own enterprise. However, it also reflects the implications of translation. Translation itself should be understood as an act of re-turn, a move (back and forth) towards the other side. Translation is a movement through which the encounter becomes possible. Translation, we should assume, is another mode (a method) of re-gathering. Not words alone, but traditions, heritages, generations, are recalled in every act of translation. 19
V
The "first word" is the simplest and yet the most elusive. For it demands that we return to forgotten contexts of language and cognition and regain the skill of speaking with nature. Wittig hints at a certain form of life, the circle of the "kleine Leute," 20 the simple people, men of the land still familiar with these acts of proper language. These people, who never strayed too far from the garden,
